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Deliberative Performance of Television News in Three Types of Democracy: 
Insights From the U.S., Germany, and Russia 
 
Abstract 
 
We show that television news is considerably more deliberative in established (U.S., 
Germany) than in defective democracies (Russia) and slightly more deliberative in a power-
sharing political system (Germany) than in a power-concentrating system (U.S.). We further 
demonstrate that public-service channels, nonpartisan programs, and in-depth news shows 
make stronger overall contributions toward deliberativeness than their respective counterparts. 
While national news cultures produce distinct national styles of mediated deliberation, 
individual channels in the U.S. (Fox, CNN) and Russia (REN) cut across these national 
patterns. The significance of deliberative media content for citizens and political elites is 
discussed. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Deliberation; Television; News, Journalism; International & Comparative; Quantitative - 
Content Analysis 
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Deliberative Performance of Television News in Three Types of Democracy: 
Insights From the U.S., Germany, and Russia 
 
The democratic performance of the news media has been a central concern for 
communication scholars from Walter Lippmann (1922) to Denis McQuail (1992) and C. 
Edwin Baker (2002), and the discussion continues to this day. Most would agree that 
democracy cannot function well if important social groups are excluded from public debate in 
the news media, if that debate amounts to nothing but an empty shouting match, or if political 
news ignores the substance of actual political decisions. But coming from such common sense 
perceptions, how can we capture the contribution of news media to democratic life in a 
systematic and meaningful way? Any attempt in this direction faces at least three main 
challenges: (a) choosing theoretically meaningful performance criteria, (b) choosing 
empirically relevant media types and outlets, and (c) selecting the right kind of countries to 
capture the full range of democratic performance. 
Concerning the normative criteria we heed the call by Althaus (2012) for a “systematic 
normative assessment” that taps existing normative theories of democracy to derive 
performance standards, instead of ad-hoc judgments. In this study we deliberately draw on the 
most demanding variant, the theory of deliberative democracy. Deliberative theory favors 
civil, argumentative exchange and thus exceeds the sparser demands of its liberal, republican 
and agonistic counterparts (Ferree et al., 2002; Baker, 2002; Strömback, 2005; for a 
particularly undemanding version see Zaller, 2003). The explicit development of normative 
performance criteria for the news media is also more advanced in the deliberative than in 
other traditions (see Gastil, 2008; Wessler, 2008).  
With respect to media types we focus on television news in commercial, public-service, 
and state-controlled channels. It is striking that deliberative qualities have been studied in 
print media (e.g. Ferree et al., 2002; Dekavalla, 2012), talk radio and television talk shows 
DELIBERATIVE NEWS PERFORMANCE   4 
 
 
(e.g., Mutz, 2007; Jacobs & Townsley, 2011) as well as online discussion forums and blogs 
(e.g., Xenos, 2008), but that television news has been largely neglected. After all, television 
news is the most important source of political information for most people in most countries 
(see Papathanassopoulos et al., 2013; Trilling & Schoenbach, 2012) and television exposes 
viewers to alternative viewpoints more often than newspapers and thus should support 
deliberative qualities in citizens more strongly (Goldman & Mutz, 2011). 
Finally, most studies of the news media’s democratic performance focus on a narrow 
group of established democracies in the West (e.g. Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Esser, 2008).The 
third challenge therefore lies in covering the range of democratic systems to also include 
unstable and defective varieties (Merkel 2004). The defective democracy we look at in this 
study, Russia, qualifies as both “illiberal” with deficiencies in the rule of law and weak 
judicial oversight of the executive and legislative branches, and “delegative,” in the sense that 
power is delegated to a strong president who then rules as he pleases (Voltmer, 2012). 
Investigating news discourse in Russia helps put into perspective the differences found among 
the more widely studied Western democracies. 
We will start with an overview of the limited existing research on cross-national 
differences in deliberative media performance, present a multidimensional construct of 
deliberativeness in television news, and develop hypotheses and a research question about the 
impact of system, organizational and news format variables on the deliberative features of 
television news. We then present findings from a large-scale analysis of television news 
content in the U.S., Germany, and Russia and spell out the factors conducive (and 
detrimental) to deliberative performance. Finally, we map the characteristics of mediated 
deliberation as realized in television news shows in a single two-dimensional space and 
analyze cross-national similarities and differences. 
Mediated Deliberation in Television News and Across Systems 
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According to a systematic search on the Communication and Mass Media Complete 
journal database and Google Scholar about 70 publications in the last two decades explicitly 
employ a deliberative framework in analyzing media content.1
In addition, the existing studies do not systematically reflect on how particular levels and 
forms of deliberation in television news relate to different empirical models of democracy and 
different types of media organizations (for an exception, see Benson, 2013). Ferree et al. 
(2002) study one issue, the debate about abortion legislation, in U.S. and German newspapers 
and show that the U.S. debate is more inclusive – featuring more people affected by the 
problem and more “ordinary citizens” – than the German debate, but that levels of dialogue 
and civility are quite similar in the two countries. Benson (2013) compares U.S. and French 
newspapers and television news and finds that due to differences in press-politics interactions 
and news formats French media generally provide more diverse perspectives on social issues, 
more in-depth information and critical debate (p. 206). Finally, Wessler (2008) argues that 
print media in countries conforming to Hallin & Mancini’s (2004) media system types – 
liberal, democratic-corporatist, polarized-pluralist – should differ systematically in the kind of 
mediated deliberation they offer. He proposes a research strategy for investigating 
deliberativeness comparatively so as to detect the structural and cultural prerequisites of 
mediated deliberation. Our study builds on and extends the comparative argument made by all 
three studies and uses discourse criteria developed by Ferree et al. (2002) and Wessler (2008). 
 Twenty-two publications focus 
exclusively or partly on television content. These studies follow different methodological 
approaches and typically use a small number of diverse measures of deliberativeness ranging 
from actor and idea inclusiveness to justification of and dialogue between different positions. 
A comprehensive instrument that systematically gauges the input, throughput and output 
aspects of deliberation in television news is lacking, however. 
Criteria of Deliberativeness: The Dependent Variables 
DELIBERATIVE NEWS PERFORMANCE   6 
 
 
The deliberativeness of television news is a multi-dimensional construct, and we 
distinguish three dimensions (input, throughput, output) with five sub-dimensions and thirteen 
individual criteria of deliberativeness (Table 1). The input dimension of mediated deliberation 
concerns the range of topics and actors found in TV news (not any extra-media phenomenon) 
and covers two criteria pertaining to a proper information base and three criteria of actor 
inclusiveness. The throughput dimension comprises two criteria of debate quality and four 
concerning the sophistication of discourse in TV news. Finally, the output dimension carries 
two criteria that specify the relation of TV news content to political decisions. It should be 
noted upfront that it would be arbitrary to specify an absolute optimum for each criterion on 
the basis of theoretical considerations alone. Instead, in this paper we provide relative 
assessments of deliberative performance by using a comparative approach that identifies 
empirical minimums and maximums for each criterion on the basis of a maximally diverse set 
of channels and types of democracies.  
[Table 1 about here] 
First, on the input side of television news discourse deliberative democratic theory is 
particularly concerned with the openness of debate. No contentious issue should be 
permanently suppressed and the range of voices should not be structurally curtailed (see 
Ferree et al., 2002, pp. 232-236; Gastil, 2008, p. 52). By opening up public debate both in a 
topical and in a social sense the news media should redress some of the inequalities in media 
access that exist because actors command different levels of resources to express their views. 
The most basic value in public deliberation consists in “creat[ing] a solid information base” 
(Gastil, 2008, p. 52) for television users to draw on. From a deliberative point of view the 
share of political content [1] should be high compared to other content, particularly soft and 
entertainment news. In addition, television news should not focus on a few issues all of the 
time. Consequently, the diversity of political topics [2] is a second important standard that has 
not been investigated in prior research. Concerning the range of different voices heard in the 
DELIBERATIVE NEWS PERFORMANCE   7 
 
 
news it is particularly important for Habermas (1996, pp. 359-387) that powerful actors from 
the center of the political and economic systems are supplemented by actors from the 
periphery such as civil society organizations, experts and ordinary citizens (see the civil 
society [3] criterion in Table 1). Attached to this criterion is the expectation that the top-down, 
routine mode of political decision-making be reversed every now and then and societal 
concerns channeled “upward” into the political power centers. In addition, a particular 
premium is placed on actors such as intellectuals, experts, and individual citizens, who 
primarily contribute ideas to public discourse rather than articulating their own interests 
(Peters, 2008, p. 94-99). These actors are seen as least detached from the authentic concerns 
and communicative rationality of the life-world. For this reason we include a second, 
narrower criterion of inclusiveness in our analysis (citizens and experts [4]).2
Second, the throughput-related criteria distinguish the deliberative tradition most clearly 
from other traditions of democratic theory (see Ferree et al., 2002, pp. 217-222). This pertains 
to the structure of communication, where debate is privileged over monologue, as well as to 
the degree of sophistication, where reasoned, civil exchanges are preferred to clamor and 
denigration. A necessary condition for debate is the existence of opposing positions [6] in a 
news item (see the “dialogic structure” variable in Ferree et al., 2002, p. 240; also Rohlinger, 
2007). While this criterion is certainly shared with conceptions of news and journalism in 
other theories of democracy, the deliberative tradition is distinct in valuing the direct 
responses of speakers to each others’ points of view (see responsive utterances [7]; cf. 
Bennett et al., 2004). Direct substantive responses can potentially segregate compelling from 
untenable arguments (Peters, 2008, p. 118). One, if not the, foremost criterion of 
 Finally, 
inclusiveness should also be understood in political-institutional terms. For open democratic 
debate to thrive, opposition parties must be given a public voice and government speakers 
must not remain uncontested in public discourse. Thus we include the share of opposition 
speakers [5] as our final criterion of inclusiveness. 
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sophistication in deliberative theory is the share of justification [8] present in substantive 
discussion of shared problems (see Chambers, 2010). In the context of mediated deliberation, 
this criterion demands that journalists obtain reasons from political actors for their claims and 
positions and make them accessible for public deliberation (Ettema, 2007). While non-
verifiable justifications such as references to abstract principles are not generally discarded as 
illegitimate in deliberative democratic theory we expect that communicative pressures on 
speakers towards accuracy in their statements as well as potential cognitive gains for 
audiences will be greater if the justifications are, at least potentially, verifiable justifications 
[9]. Furthermore, theories placing deliberation at the heart of the democratic process 
recognize that the civility [10] of mutual engagement is a necessary condition for varied 
positive consequences of exposure to political disagreement (e.g., Mansbridge, 1983; Mutz, 
2006)—a recognition that has been shown to apply to mediated deliberation as well (e.g., 
Mutz, 2007).3
Third, on the output side of mediated deliberation it is important to recognize that 
“[d]iscourses do not govern. They generate a communicative power that cannot take the place 
of administration but can only influence it.” Habermas (1992, p. 452) thus succinctly points to 
the limitations of mediated deliberation on the output side, but also to its necessary connection 
to political decisions. In assessing the deliberativeness of television news across issues, 
organizations, and countries it is impossible to directly measure the clout of that 
communicative power in influencing political decisions. The deliberative function of 
television news rather lies in enabling citizens to generate informed opinions and engage in 
 A final yardstick for the sophistication of public deliberation is the degree to 
which it carries a potential for self-reflexivity in the form of meta-deliberation [11]. 
Underlying this criterion is the realization that any democratic polity needs practices that 
facilitate continuous democratic innovation (Fung, 2012). Discussing the terms and conditions 
of public debate thus becomes a society-wide democratic endeavor and indeed a fundamental 
question of social justice (e.g., Gamson, 1999). 
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meaningful political activity in order to influence decisions themselves. Therefore, television 
news should point out how political debates are connected to political decisions (decision-
relatedness [12]) and, even more importantly, to do so before the respective decision is taken 
(pre-decision debate [13], see Higgins, 2006). Note that deliberative theory does not have to 
assume that mediated deliberation leads to or should lead to substantive consensus in public 
discourse itself, as some have argued it does (e.g., Gerhards, 1997; Ferree et al., 2002). By 
casting the output dimension of mediated deliberation in terms of its topical and temporal 
relation to political decision-making we circumvent the conceptual problems that arise when 
the consensus-orientation of communicative action (Habermas, 1987) is transposed too 
literally as the desired outcome of public debates (for a similar argument see Rinke et al., 
2013).  
It should be noted that, conceptually, each of the thirteen criteria is normatively relevant 
independent of the others. For example, it constitutes a deliberative gain if speakers justify 
their positions, even if these speakers were only members of the elites (and inclusiveness 
would therefore be very low). Conversely, it is normatively desirable to have a diverse actor 
set including civil society actors in TV news programs, even if none of these actors justifies 
their positions. Theoretically, therefore, the thirteen criteria are independently valuable and 
thus carry the same level of normative importance.  
Structural Prerequisites of Deliberative Television News 
With the thirteen criteria mentioned we have a comprehensive theoretical basis for the 
relative assessment of deliberativeness in different television news shows. But what are the 
conditions conducive to deliberative performance? The scarce literature on the topic does not 
offer a fixed set of likely explanatory factors. Rather, these have to be carved out of various 
separate strands of research in communication and political science. On the macro-level of the 
political system, the distinction between established and defective democracies is important. 
Defective democracy is an umbrella term for various structural deficiencies including 
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limitations on press freedom, strong state dominance in the media system, and a weak civil 
society (Vartanova, 2012). It stands to reason that all of this will limit the inclusion of non-
state actors in mediated deliberation (input) as well as effective debate between well justified 
opposing positions (throughput). Television news in established democracies will be more 
deliberative than in defective democracies (H1). 
It is less clear, however, whether the deliberativeness of television news will differ 
between our two cases of established democracies, Germany and the United States. Several 
authors have pointed to the impact of political system variables on the shape of mediated 
deliberation (Ferree et al., 2002; Kriesi, 2004; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; see also Nir, 2012). 
The distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies (Lijphart, 2012), especially 
the degree of institutionalized power-sharing between executives, parties, and other political 
interest groups on what Lijphart calls the executives-parties dimension plays a prominent role 
here (Kriesi, 2004). The U.S. is a moderate majoritarian system on this dimension, with power 
concentrated in the hands of the majority party and elected president, and Germany a 
moderate consensus system, in which power is shared between several parties in coalition 
governments (Lijphart, 2012, p. 244).4 Kriesi (2004) argues that consensus systems tend to 
produce less mediated public contestation. Political actors in countries with highly fragmented 
political power structures are expected to rely less on strategies of public contestation to 
galvanize voters or negotiate political positions, but more on behind-the-scenes negotiations 
(Pfetsch, 2003). Nir (2012) on the other hand argues that power-sharing systems produce 
more public deliberation because the higher number of political parties creates incentives to 
stake out ideological differences more clearly for voters. If the influence of the political 
system on the quantity of mediated deliberation is unresolved, its effect on deliberative 
quality is even more unclear. Instead of formulating a hypothesis we therefore revert to the 
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following research question: Will television news be more deliberative in a majoritarian or in 
a consensus democracy? 
On the meso-level, the type of media organization is bound to have an impact on the 
deliberativeness of television news. Television channels can be institutionalized in three main 
ways: as public-service, commercial, and state-controlled channels. Public-service channels 
are distinguished from other networks by obligations codified in legal and administrative 
charters and specific professional commitments to providing quality journalism and 
engendering meaningful societal debate (Benson & Powers, 2011). While commercial stations 
may also produce quality journalism and contribute to public discourse, profit is their main 
organizational goal. The available empirical literature shows that market orientation, on 
average, limits the sophistication of public affairs reporting (Cushion, 2012). We therefore 
expect deliberativeness to be higher in public-service channels. State-controlled channels, in 
turn, are clearly curtailed in their ability to foster inclusive and uncoerced debate so that 
deliberativeness will be low here. Deliberativeness of television news will be higher in public-
service than in commercial channels and deliberativeness in both of these types will be higher 
than in state-controlled channels (H2). 
State-controlled channels can be either owned by state agencies exerting direct command 
or privately owned and more indirectly controlled through intimidation. The latter type, which 
we call semi-autonomous, should exhibit somewhat stronger deliberativeness than the state-
owned type. In a defective democracy, television news in semi-autonomous channels will be 
more deliberative than in state-owned channels (H3). 
Commercial channels, on the other hand, can either follow the historically dominant 
“catchall formula” by attracting viewers from all sides of the political spectrum or they may 
advance the partisan politics of their owners or supporters. Partisanship can be expected to 
curtail the inclusiveness of mediated debate by privileging speakers from one camp. In 
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established democracies, television news in non-partisan channels will be more deliberative 
than in partisan channels (H4). 
Finally, on the micro-level of editorial decisions about individual shows television news 
has been subject to a diversification of formats. To keep things simple and applicable across 
different national contexts we distinguish two main formats: fact-centered newscasts that 
mainly feature items read out by anchors and relatively short pre-produced video reports on 
the one hand, and focused in-depth news shows that concentrate on a limited number of topics 
and offer interviews and longer background pieces on the other. Evidently, in-depth news 
shows offer more possibilities for journalists to feature different voices presumably making 
them more inclusive, responsive and argumentative than fact-centered newscasts. Focused in-
depth news shows will be more deliberative than fact-centered newscasts (H5).  
 
Method 
The data to test the above hypotheses and answer the research question were generated in a 
large-scale quantitative content analysis of the main evening television news programs from 
ten national television stations in the United States, Germany, and the Russian Federation (see 
Table 2).5 The choice of channels was based on considerations of their prototypicality for the 
respective combination of attributes in each cell and their market share in the respective 
segment. 6
[Table 2 about here] 
 
On the one hand we look at general-interest television stations of the public-service, the 
commercial, and the state-controlled variant. The two Russian general-interest channels differ 
in the degree to which they are subject to direct government influence: REN-TV manages to 
insulate itself somewhat from direct government interference, which is why we label it semi-
autonomous, while Pervy is directly subjected to state control. We also study news-only 
television channels, which are either non-partisan (n-tv, CNN) or partisan (Fox News, R24).7 
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Among the newscasts aired by these different types of television stations four are focused in-
depth news shows (CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360°, ARD-Tagesthemen, PBS’s News Hour, 
and Fox News Channel’s Fox Report); all others are more fact-centered newscasts. 
For each of the channels in our sample, we analyzed data from two constructed weeks 
random-sampled from the six-month periods between October 1, 2009 and March 31, 2010 
and from April 1, 2010 to September 30, 2010. All sampled newscasts were recorded and the 
audiovisual material was coded directly without using transcripts. Variables were measured 
for two units of analysis: news items (“stories”) and, nested within them, utterances made by 
or attributed to actors. An overview of our operationalizations is given in Table 1; the 
complete unitizing and coding protocol is available in the Online Appendix (located at 
http://mkw.uni-mannheim.de/hwessler). Coding was done by eight student coders who 
underwent intensive, multi-wave coder training (approx. 50h per coder). The analysis 
included a total of 2.340 news items, and 10.308 direct and quoted utterances. Several 
measures were taken to ensure high data quality. All coders received the exact same training 
and instructions and were fluent in German and at least one of the two other source languages 
(English and Russian). Coders were rotated over the material so as to code news content from 
Germany and at least one other country (Russia or the U.S.) to ensure an even spread of 
possible remaining idiosyncratic coding error across at least two countries and prevent undue 
bias in the data for any single country. In addition, the entire corpus of television material was 
coded twice by pairs of independent coders. As an initial step upon completion of the double-
coding process, percent agreement, Brennan and Prediger’s kappa (1981), and Krippendorff’s 
alpha (2004) were calculated for every variable as measures of intercoder reliability. Brennan 
and Prediger’s kappa corrects for chance agreement between coders by subtracting from raw 
agreement a chance agreement term based on the number of available categories. 
Krippendorff’s alpha employs covariance-based correction for chance. Overall, the double-
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coding process showed acceptable levels of intercoder reliability (kappa or alpha > .7) for all 
but three variables: topic, decision-relatedness, and justification (Table 3). 
[Table 3 about here] 
To remedy the remaining problems on these variables, pairs of coders identified each and 
every coder disagreement and adjudicated them via consensus decisions. Coder consensus can 
be used to reduce error in the data and is common practice in research involving rating tasks, 
for example in meta-analytic research (see Orwin & Vevea, 2009, p. 184). We accounted for 
two known pitfalls of coder consensus: Systematic error due to between-pair bias was avoided 
by again rotating the adjudicating coder pairs over the material; systematic error due to 
within-pair bias (e.g., due to deferral to the more senior coder) was avoided by pairing student 
coders that were equally familiar and involved with the project. This concluding step ensured 
that final coder agreement is much higher than the pre-consensus-decision reliability 
coefficients in Table 3 indicate. In light of the measures taken, we are confident that no major 
systematic bias occurred in the cross-national measurement of our variables. The quality of 
data used in this study can be considered very high. 
 
Results 
Tables 4 to 6 show the exact values for all news programs and all criteria on the input, 
throughput, and output dimensions of deliberativeness and rank them accordingly. 8 If we 
compute the mean rank for each newscast across all thirteen criteria, we have a rough measure 
of its overall deliberative performance.9
[Tables 4 to 6 about here] 
 It turns out that CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360° has 
the highest mean rank (4.46), followed by ARD-Tagesthemen, ABC’s World News and PBS’s 
News Hour. On the low end of overall deliberative performance we find the three Russian 
channels R24, REN and Pervy as well as German commercial broadcaster RTL. However, a 
closer look at Tables 4 to 6 reveals some striking divergences from this overall mean. 
DELIBERATIVE NEWS PERFORMANCE   15 
 
 
On the input side (Table 4) German commercial broadcaster RTL (overall rank 8) 
surprisingly leads the field due to its high topical diversity and great openness to civil society 
actors as well as ordinary citizens and experts. At the same time the partisan news-only 
channel Fox News (overall rank 7) drops to rank 10 on the input dimension mainly because it 
features very few civil society actors. The throughput dimension (Table 5) exhibits relatively 
little differences to the overall mean, but here RTL and the German commercial news-only 
channel n-tv, fall into the lowest segment. Both channels offer very little responsive debate 
and justifications. The output dimension (Table 6), in turn, is characterized by a very different 
pattern. Here both partisan news-only channels, Fox News (USA) and Rossiya 24 (RUS) as 
well as n-tv (GER) enter the top group. It seems that their targeting of more elite audiences 
leads them to focus on how news relates to political decisions. N-tv and Fox even provide pre-
decision debate to a considerable degree. On the other end of the scale PBS and ARD-
Tagesschau (overall ranks 4 and 5) fall into the lowest segment on the output dimension; PBS 
in particular offers more free-wheeling news that is less related to political decisions than 
most other channels. 
The four overall top performers CNN (USA), ARD-Tagesthemen (GER), ABC and PBS 
(both USA) differ considerably in their profiles. While the three U.S. news shows are 
consistently strong on the debate criteria, echoing the prominence of the balance norm in 
Anglo-American mainstream journalism, ARD-TT is weak in this respect but particularly 
strong in including the opposition parties into public debate, in eliciting verifiable 
justifications from speakers, and in connecting debates to imminent political decisions. 
Explaining Differential Levels of Deliberativeness 
Concerning the type of democracy, we predicted that deliberativeness will be higher in 
established than in defective democracies (H1). And indeed, the television newscasts from 
Russia, our case of a defective democracy, are much less deliberative than those from the U.S. 
and Germany. When we compute country-wise mean ranks across all criteria, Russia’s mean 
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rank is 2.85, while the U.S. news shows display a mean rank of 1.62 and those from Germany 
a mean rank of 1.54. The answer to our research question (Will television news be more 
deliberative in a majoritarian or in a consensus democracy?) points to a slight advantage for 
consensus systems, albeit by a relatively slim margin. Both the U.S. and Germany are 
moderate cases of their respective system types so that we should expect to see clearer 
differences in more pure cases. But there is no plausible reason to believe that the study of 
such cases would revert the pattern we found. Ferree et al. (2002), the only other study that 
directly compares deliberativeness of media content (in this case, newspapers) between the 
U.S. and Germany, finds no interpretable difference in the overall level of deliberativeness 
but strengths and weaknesses on different criteria and thus two different variants of 
deliberativeness in established democracies. We cannot completely rule out this 
interpretation, but our data tilt the scale more in favor of power-sharing systems. 
In H2 we expected that public-service channels display higher levels than commercial 
channels and both fare better than state-controlled channels. This hypothesis is confirmed. 
When we merge all newscasts by organizational types and compute mean ranks across all 
criteria for each type, the public-service stations (ARD and PBS) come in first with a mean 
rank of 1.38, followed by the commercial stations (RTL, ABC, n-tv, CNN and Fox News) 
with a mean rank of 1.77 and the state-controlled channels (Pervy, REN and R24; mean rank 
2.85). The statutory and legal requirements as well as professional commitments of public-
service channels do seem to boost deliberativeness in comparison to their commercial and, 
even more strongly, their state-controlled counterparts. 
H3 and H4 pertained to within-country comparisons in Russia and the U.S. We 
hypothesized in H3 that in Russia deliberativeness is higher in the semi-autonomous channel 
REN than in the state-owned channels Pervy and R24. This was not confirmed when we look 
at mean ranks across all criteria, where REN has the same mean rank as Pervy (7.15) with 
R24 tailing at 7.62. What distinguishes the semi-autonomous REN from the two state-owned 
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channels is its openness for a wide range of civil society actors and speakers from the political 
opposition as well as its focus on pre-decision debate. In this respect REN, although only on 
rank 9 overall, marks a clear alternative to the state-centered channels in Russia. H4 
hypothesized that in an established democracy, deliberativeness will be higher in non-partisan 
than in partisan channels. This hypothesis was confirmed since CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360° 
turned out much better than the Fox Report (mean rank of 4.46 versus 6.69). 
Finally, H5 in which we hypothesized that focused in-depth news shows perform better 
than more fact-centered newscasts was clearly confirmed since three of the four top ranks are 
occupied by focused in-depth news shows: CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360° (rank 1), ARD-
Tagesthemen (rank 2), and PBS’s News Hour (rank 4), while the forth in-depth news show, 
Fox Report, reached rank 7. By comparison, fact-centered newscasts fare much worse on 
average and thus offer less deliberative news to their viewers. 
Mapping Deliberativeness in Television News Across Cases and Key Criteria 
As a final step of analysis key criteria of deliberativeness were used to map the 
“deliberative space” of television news using a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA; see 
Figure 1).10 Among the thirteen criteria we selected those that reflect the essence of 
deliberativeness most clearly on each of the three dimensions: On the input dimension 
deliberativeness is most closely related to both social and political inclusiveness, in terms of 
the throughput the core of deliberativeness lies in an exchange of well justified opposing 
positions and on the output dimension deliberativeness is about relating this exchange to 
(imminent) political decision. This conceptual core of deliberativeness is best captured by 
Civil society [3] and Opposition speakers [5], Opposing positions [6] and Justification [8] as 
well as Decision-relatedness [12]. In practical terms, a two-dimensional representation such as 
an MCA biplot limits the number of criteria that can be usefully displayed and five proved to 
be the maximum number yielding an interpretable graph. Therefore no additional criteria were 
included. 
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The two axes of the two-dimensional space are interpreted through orthogonal projection 
of the variable categories onto the respective dimension: The further away from the origin and 
the closer to the axis a category is located, the more it correlates with the respective 
dimension. Categories close to the origin bear only little influence on the substantive 
interpretation of the dimension. The smaller the distance between two variable categories, the 
more similar they are; the greater the distance between them, the more dissimilar they are. In 
order to investigate the position of the different news channels in this “deliberative space”, 
they were projected into it as passive variable categories post-hoc, after the spatial solution 
had been derived from an MCA of the deliberativeness indicators (see Greenacre, 2006, pp. 
70-74). This positions the channels in accordance with their actual values on the five variables 
that make up the space without distorting the space by the positions of the channels 
themselves. The closer the news channels appear in the biplot, the more similar their 
deliberativeness profiles are. 
The two-dimensional solution in Figure 1 explains 63.4% of the total variance (inertia) of 
the five deliberativeness indicators. However, most of the variance (59.1%) is explained by 
the first (horizontal) dimension which mainly discriminates between news coverage focused 
on speakers from the political center (displayed on the left side) and non-official speakers. 
This means that the major dimension of television news deliberativeness, as indicated by the 
five criteria used here, is the degree to which political elites or non-elites are given a voice on 
television news. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The second (vertical) dimension only adds another 4.3% of explained inertia. It represents 
more subtle differences mostly connected to the throughput and output criteria Opposing 
positions [6], Justification [8] and Decision-relatedness [12]. To interpret the dense cloud 
close to the origin in Figure 1 it is important to see which categories cluster together on which 
side of the horizontal line. Above this line television news tends to engage more in the 
DELIBERATIVE NEWS PERFORMANCE   19 
 
 
presentation of opposing positions when reporting on authoritative political decisions after 
they have been made, and this presentation of opposing positions also generally tends to lead 
to a greater exchange of justifications by speakers. Also, opposition and civil society speakers 
tend to appear more in such situations. Below the horizontal axis pre- or no-decision reporting 
is associated with the absence of opposing positions and justifications. The vertical dimension 
may thus be read as distinguishing between a more declaratory, justification-poor pre-decision 
reporting in which government officials take center stage on the one hand and a more 
argumentative, justification-rich post-decision reporting in which the display of opposing 
positions, mostly from the parliamentary opposition and civil society speakers, combine on 
the other hand. 
From a comparative point of view it is decisive where the individual news shows come 
down in the overall space. Three clusters of news shows emerge: The two Russian state 
channels are located in the lower left corner indicating that they are both characterized by a 
strong dominance of state actors as well as a lack of opposing positions and justifications. The 
German news shows as well as Fox Report (USA) fall below and left of the origin of the axes. 
This means that they tend to privilege state speakers and favor coverage that is non-
argumentative (i.e., not showing contrasting positions and justifications) as well as focused on 
pre-decision debate, albeit to a much lesser degree than the Russian state channels. The third 
group of news shows clusters in the upper part of the deliberative space with the U.S. 
channels PBS, ABC and the Russian semi-autonomous REN relatively close to the center and 
CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360° in the upper right corner. These news shows combine 
opposing positions, justifications and a post-decision focus with an orientation toward civil 
society speakers (CNN) or the political opposition (REN). 
Figure 1 thus demonstrates how distinct national news cultures entail distinct deliberative 
performances of television news. But it also shows that cross-national variation clearly is not 
the only explanation for patterns of deliberativeness. Several channels deviate from the 
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national pattern, most notably REN and Fox. The semi-autonomous REN provides a more 
deliberative alternative to the state-owned channels in Russia by balancing government with 
opposition voices (y-axis) and giving more voice to civil society (x-axis). REN is also much 
closer to the cluster of throughput and output deliberativeness in the upper right quadrant than 
its state-owned counterparts. Fox News on the other hand deviates from the mainstream of 
U.S. television news culture, especially regarding the weaker deliberativeness of its 
throughput (y-axis) but also with respect to its somewhat greater focus on official politics as 
opposed to civil society on the input dimension (x-axis). Among the countries studied here 
Germany has the most homogeneous deliberativeness profile with all four news shows 
forming a close national cluster. 
 
Discussion 
This study provides the first systematic demonstration of the deliberative strengths and 
weaknesses of television news in diverse institutional and organizational settings and in 
different television news formats. It shows that state control of the news media clearly 
depresses deliberative performance, a finding that holds both between countries (Germany 
and the U.S. versus Russia) and between channels within Russia where a more deliberative 
semi-autonomous commercial channel like REN outperforms its state-owned counterparts. In 
established democracies consensus systems characterized by power sharing are more likely to 
produce deliberative news output than majoritarian systems. Our data is not completely 
conclusive because the countries studied are moderate cases on Lijphart’s (2012) executives-
parties dimension. So we do not know how large the difference in deliberativeness would be 
for pure cases. But our data suggest that a more consensus-oriented political culture offers 
more incentives for deliberative public debate. And we have no reason to believe that 
consensus systems show a dearth of mediated public contestation as Kriesi (2004) and Pfetsch 
(2003) suggest. Our study also confirms the democratic advantages of public-service 
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broadcasting vis-à-vis commercial channels (see Aalberg et al., 2010; Esser et al., 2012, 
Iyengar et al., 2010). While previous studies offer evidence on the sub-dimension that we call 
“Information base,” with our comprehensive catalogue of quality criteria we are able to show, 
in addition, that the merits of public-service news provision extend across all three 
dimensions and are particularly pronounced with respect to the throughput criteria (opposing 
positions, responsive utterances, justification, civility). This is due to the specific statutory 
and legal responsibilities and professional cultures of public-service channels. 
We thus have evidence that institutional settings with strong public-service channels (such 
as those found in many European countries) do contribute to the provision of deliberative 
news content to citizens more than settings in which public-service broadcasting is weak or 
endangered. In addition, non-partisan channels generate better deliberative performance than 
partisan ones, a finding that supports Sunstein’s (2007) widely acknowledged argument for 
the value of what he calls “general interest intermediaries.” Our analysis clearly reveals that 
Fox News provides not only less inclusive but also less interactive debate than CNN. This 
lends credence to the idea that fragmented news environments, be they fragmented by the 
sheer number of channels available or along ideological lines, tend to diminish democratic 
benefits both in the news and in citizens (see Nir, 2012a, 2012b).  
At the top end of the spectrum and across all thirteen criteria CNN’s Anderson Cooper 
360° comes out as the best performer, followed by the in-depth news show of German public 
broadcaster ARD (Tagesthemen) and ABC’s World News.11 These programs seem to define 
different deliberative optimums in television news programming, illustrating that deliberative 
television news can be realized in divergent, but possibly complementary ways. While 
Anderson Cooper is particularly strong on inclusive and responsive debate and shows above-
average performance on a number of other accounts, ARD-Tagesthemen excels in including 
opposition speakers, eliciting verifiable justifications from speakers through its interviews and 
reports and in linking debates on a diverse set of political issues to political decision-making. 
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ABC’s World News is a more fact-centered news format and, in combining the balance norm 
long established in American journalism (e.g., Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) with the 
characteristic “news you can use” approach of commercial news media (Esser, 2008), 
performs well in featuring opposing positions in news items that often include non-official 
voices as well as links to political decisions. 
Our study has a number of limitations that are worth acknowledging. First, our country 
sample is small and thus limited in diversity. The differences found between majoritarian and 
consensus systems could be further corroborated (or qualified) (a) by including more pure 
consensus systems such as Switzerland oder the Netherlands in addition to the moderate case 
we have studied, and (b) by including polarized-pluralist variants of majoritarianism such as 
those found in Southern Europe to complement the U.S (Lijphart, 2012; Kriesi, 2004; Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004). Also, less authoritarian cases of post-Soviet transformation such as Poland 
should be studied to fill the gap between Russia and the established Western democracies.  
Second, our set of indicators could be refined in some cases and expanded in others. We 
have already mentioned possibilities for a more fine-grained typology of actors that would 
separate, for example, experts from pundits and public intellectuals as well as strong from 
weak civil society organizations. The only condition here is that such distinctions must be 
borne out by normative reasoning that specifies why the inclusion of a particular actor 
category is relevant for the functioning of democracy. Additional quality criteria are also 
conceivable. While we have defined both a conceptual core and a full set of criteria of 
deliberativeness other authors use additional standards that can support deliberative success. 
Benson (2013), for example, looks at criticism of the government, a possible indicator for 
how wide the space of noncoercive bottom-up deliberation actually is. The width of the 
ideological spectrum represented in media debate can serve as a standard of inclusiveness 
beyond actor representation. And our own measure of responsiveness could be extended into 
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an analysis of who responds to whom in news discourse in order to reconstruct relations of 
accountability and justification between actors.  
Third, in this paper we have not looked at whether some of our criteria of deliberativeness 
are empirically interrelated, particularly across the three dimensions: Does an inclusive actor 
set go along with more opposing positions and more responsive utterances? If included, is the 
citizen public indeed shown passive, without opportunity to make and justify their points or 
address issues that are up for decision (Lewis, Wahl-Jorgensen, & Inthorn, 2004)? Does the 
inclusion of the political opposition enhance decisions-relatedness and diminish civility? And 
do such possible interrelations hold across contexts and formats, or not? The internal 
contingencies of mediated deliberation have never been systematically studied before so that 
this route of inquiry seems to be the most obvious next step. 
Finally, while we identified a number of institutional and organizational prerequisites of 
deliberative television news, its consequences for citizens and elites are not well understood 
yet. Deliberative news content, we contend, has profound implications for citizens’ ability to 
form considered opinions and develop preferences that take other citizens’ interests and 
perspectives into account. Thereby, deliberative news content can foster perceptions of 
common concerns and solutions, including solutions that require trade-offs between 
individual gains and public solidarity. Political decision-makers, in turn, can be held to 
account because deliberative news coverage checks the quality of their justifications and 
thereby directly affects the level of legitimacy they enjoy (Wessler, 2008). Building on our 
study researchers are now in a position to empirically test the effects of different elements and 
models of mediated deliberation in television news on citizens’ and decision-makers’ attitudes 
and practices. Conversely, our results on the Russian case put researchers in a better spot to 
investigate the challenges faced and strategies employed by citizens in news environments 
that do not exhibit satisfactory deliberative standards. Either way, much work lies ahead. 
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Table 1 Criteria of deliberativeness used in this study 
Dimension/ 
sub-dimension 
Criterion Operationalization 
I. Input dimension 
Information base [1] Political topics Share of news items that have a political topic as their 
main focus (as opposed to soft news, entertainment news, 
etc.) 
[2] Diversity of 
political topics  
Standard deviation of political topic categories’ relative 
share of all political news items (based on six political 
topic categories: economic/financial policy, social policy, 
foreign/security policy, judicial policy, domestic party 
politics, and other political topics) 
Inclusiveness [3] Civil society Share of utterances originating from civil society actors 
(i.e., organized civil society, individual citizens and 
experts), as a percentage of all utterances by civil society 
and political center actors 
[4] Citizens and 
experts 
Share of non-journalistic utterances that originate from 
individual citizens or experts, as a percentage of all 
utterances by civil society and political center actors 
[5] Opposition 
speakers 
Share of utterances originating from the respective 
opposition party/parties, as a percentage of all utterances 
by actors whose party affiliation is identified 
II. Throughput dimension 
Debate [6] Opposing 
positions  
Share of all news items that contain two or more positions 
with opposing propositional content 
[7] Responsive 
utterances 
Share of all utterances that explicitly react to another 
actor’s position (irrespective of whether this other actor 
has an utterance in the same news item or not) 
Sophistication [8] Justification  Share of opinion-oriented utterances that contain a 
justification for the opinion expressed 
[9] Verifiable 
justification 
Share of opinion-oriented utterances that contain a 
potentially verifiable justification for the opinion 
expressed 
[10] Civility  Share of all utterances that do not contain a disparaging 
verbal or physical expression 
[11] Meta-
deliberation  
Share of all utterances that talk about the rules and 
conduct of mediated debates 
III. Output dimension 
Consequences [12] Decision-
relatedness 
Share of all news items in which a collectively binding 
political decision is mentioned 
[13] Pre-decision 
debate 
Share of all news items in which a collectively binding 
political decision is mentioned that lies in the future 
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Table 2 Typology of television channels studied 
 Public-service Commercial State-controlled 
General interest ARD (DE) 
PBS (US) 
RTL (DE) 
ABC (US) 
Pervy (RU) (state-owned) 
REN-TV (RU) (semi-autonomous) 
News-only, non-
partisan 
 n-tv (DE) 
CNN (US) 
 
News-only, 
partisan 
 Fox News 
(US) 
Rossiya 24 (RU) (state-owned) 
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Table 3 Pre-adjudication reliabilities for deliberativeness measures 
Measure DE  RU  US  Overall 
 N PA țn  Į  N  PA țn Į  N PA țn Į  N PA țn Į 
News item level                    
Topic 415 74.7 .73 .71  320 71.9 .70 .66  473 68.3 .66 .62  1208 71.4 .69 .66 
Decision-relatedness 96 67.7 .52 .51  52 57.7 .37 .37  97 62.9 .44 .45  245 63.7 .46 .46 
Opposing positions 415 94.2 .88 .45  323 96.0 .92 .22  467 94.0 .88 .66  1205 94.6 .89 .55 
                    
Utterance level                    
Type of speaker 2338 91.2 .91 .83  1428 84.7 .84 .74  3732 84.1 .83 .72  7498 86.4 .86 .76 
Party of speaker 514 97.9 .98 .96  428 95.8 .96 .87  958 89.2 .89 .72  1900 93.1 .93 .84 
Meta-deliberation 2340 95.1 .90 .12  1432 97.6 .95 -.01  3727 92.5 .85 .09  7499 94.3 .89 .09 
Justification 175 74.9 .62 .23  69 68.1 .52 .18  820 48.2 .22 -.05  1064 53.9 .31 .00 
Incivility 2342 100.0 1.00 .67  1433 99.9 1.00 .00  3758 99.4 .99 .20  7533 99.7 .99 .24 
Responsiveness 2342 98.8 .98 .26  1433 98.7 .97 .34  3758 96.5 .93 .26  7533 97.7 .95 .27 
Note: Cell entries are percent agreement (PA%UHQQDQDQG3UHGLJHU¶VNDSSDțnDQG.ULSSHQGRUII¶VDOSKDĮYDOXHVLQGLFDWLQJSUH-consensus-decision agreement between coders based on 
double-coding of the complete sample. N is the number of double-coded units (news items or utterances). 
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Table 4 Deliberativeness ranking of news shows: Input dimension 
News show Input mean 
rank 
(rank) 
Overall mean 
rank 
(rank) 
Political topics 
(rank)a 
Political topics 
diversity 
(rank)b 
Civil society 
(rank)c 
Citizens and 
experts 
(rank)c 
Opposition 
speakers 
(rank)d 
RTL (GER) 3.80 (1) 6.69 (8) 25.3% (8) 7.54 (1) 51.7% (1) 43.3% (1) 15.8% (8) 
CNN (USA) 5.00 (2) 4.38 (1) 32.1% (4) 14.37 (10) 45.7% (4) 33.1% (4) 34.7% (3) 
ABC (USA) 5.20 (3) 4.92 (3) 30.0% (7) 11.71 (7) 49.5% (2) 40.5% (3) 19.1% (7) 
ARD-TT (GER) 5.20 (3) 4.77 (2) 38.7% (3) 12.66 (9) 31.9% (7) 28.2% (6) 38.5% (1) 
n-tv (GER) 5.60 (5) 5.85 (6) 22.5% (10) 9.57 (3) 39.1% (5) 33.0% (5) 20.0% (5) 
PBS (USA) 5.80 (6) 5.00 (4) 44.8% (2) 11.18 (5) 32.6% (6) 27.7% (7) 15.7% (9) 
REN (RUS) 5.80 (6) 7.09 (9) 9.8% (11) 18.40 (11) 46.7% (3) 41.6% (2) 35.3% (2) 
ARD-TS (GER) 6.00 (8) 5.69 (5) 45.5% (1) 10.50 (4) 20.9% (10) 12.2% (12) 30.3% (4) 
Pervy (RUS) 6.60 (9) 7.08 (9) 31.7% (5) 8.96 (2) 24.0% (8) 22.6% (8) 3.0% (10) 
FOX (USA) 8.20 (10) 6.62 (7) 30.0% (6) 11.76 (8) 15.8% (11) 13.0% (10) 19.2% (6) 
Rossiya24 (RUS) 8.80 (11) 7.69 (11) 24.6% (9) 11.35 (6) 23.3% (9) 20.1% (9) 0.0% (11) 
Note: a Share of all news items; b Standard deviation of political topic categories’ share of all political news items (in %, based on six political topic categories); c Share of all utterances by civil society and political 
center actors (based on all news items); d Share of all utterances by actors whose party affiliation is identified (based on all news items). 
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Table 5 Deliberativeness ranking of news shows: Throughput dimension 
News show Throughput 
mean rank 
(rank) 
Overall 
mean rank 
(rank) 
Opposing 
positions 
(rank)a 
Responsive 
utterances 
(rank)b 
Justification 
(rank)c 
Verifiable 
justification 
(rank)c 
Civility 
(rank)b 
Meta-
deliberation 
(rank)b 
PBS (USA) 2.67 (1) 5.00 (4) 18.2% (1) 4.5% (2) 48.5% (1) 13.5% (2) 99.8% (6) 3.8% (4) 
CNN (USA) 3.50 (2) 4.38 (1) 12.0% (3) 5.6% (1) 33.4% (2) 8.6% (3) 98.1% (11) 5.0% (1) 
ABC (USA) 4.50 (3) 4.92 (3) 15.5% (2) 3.3% (3) 26.4% (6) 7.6% (5) 99.6% (9) 4.3% (2) 
ARD-TS (GER) 5.17 (4) 5.69 (5) 6.9% (4) 2.7% (5) 16.9% (10) 6.2% (8) 100.0% (1) 4.3% (3) 
ARD-TT (GER) 5.17 (4) 4.77 (2) 3.4% (7) 1.0% (9) 29.6% (3) 15.2% (1) 99.9% (5) 3.0% (6) 
FOX (USA) 6.00 (6) 6.62 (7) 3.7% (6) 3.0% (4) 26.8% (5) 6.5% (6) 99.7% (8) 2.6% (7) 
Pervy (RUS) 7.17 (7) 7.08 (9) 2.0% (10) 1.2% (7) 27.0% (4) 8.1% (4) 100.0% (1) 0.8% (11) 
n-tv (GER) 7.33 (8) 5.85 (6) 2.7% (8) 2.2% (6) 21.5% (7) 1.9% (11) 99.8% (7) 3.1% (5) 
Rossiya24 (RUS) 7.67 (9) 7.69 (11) 1.5% (11) 1.1% (8) 21.4% (8) 5.7% (9) 100.0% (1) 0.9% (9) 
REN (RUS) 8.50 (10) 7.09 (9) 4.6% (5) 0.7% (10) 20.3% (9) 6.5% (7) 99.5% (10) 0.8% (10) 
RTL (GER) 8.83 (11) 6.69 (8) 2.1% (9) 0.3% (11) 9.6% (11) 3.5% (10) 99.9% (4) 1.1% (8) 
Note: a Share of all news items; b Share of all utterances (based on all news items); c Share of all utterances containing a statement of opinion (based on all news items). 
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Table 6 Deliberativeness ranking of news shows: Output dimension 
News show Output 
mean rank 
(rank) 
Overall 
mean rank 
(rank) 
Decision-
relatedness 
(rank)a 
Pre-decision 
debate 
(rank)a 
n-tv (GER) 2.00 (1) 5.85 (6) 70.6% (3) 47.1% (1) 
ARD-TT (GER) 2.50 (2) 4.77 (2) 78.3% (1) 39.1% (4) 
FOX (USA) 4.50 (3) 6.62 (7) 62.2% (7) 41.5% (2) 
Rossiya24 (RUS) 5.00 (4) 7.69 (11) 67.7% (4) 35.3% (6) 
ABC (USA) 5.50 (5) 4.92 (3) 72.7% (2) 27.3% (9) 
CNN (USA) 5.50 (5) 4.38 (1) 62.8% (6) 37.3% (5) 
REN (RUS) 6.00 (7) 7.09 (9) 58.8% (9) 41.2% (3) 
ARD-TS (GER) 6.50 (8) 5.69 (5) 65.2% (5) 30.4% (8) 
RTL (GER) 7.50 (9) 6.69 (8) 62.2% (8) 35.1% (7) 
PBS (USA) 10.00 (10) 5.00 (4) 56.3% (10) 21.9% (10) 
Pervy (RUS) 11.00 (11) 7.08 (9) 43.8% (11) 15.6% (11) 
Note: a Share of all political news items. 
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Figure 1: Mapping deliberation in television news (MCA) 
 
Note: Biplot for multiple correspondence analysis using the Burt approach with post hoc scale 
adjustment (Greenacre, 2006). Row and column coordinates were obtained through principal 
normalization (i.e., coordinates are scaled by principal inertias). Analysis was performed using Stata, 
version 11 (StataCorp, 2009). 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 The search comprised five steps. First, a search of Communication and Mass Media Complete and Google 
Scholar was performed using the following query: (media) AND (deliberation OR deliberative OR 
deliberativeness). Second, we used the bibliographies of all relevant items retrieved in step one for a backward 
search of further items. Third, we used Google Scholar’s “cited by” functionality for a forward search on the 
basis of all relevant items found until step 2. Steps two and three were reiterated for newly found items until no 
more relevant items could be identified. Finally, we added relevant publications not found via this procedure but 
known to us. For the most part, these were older non-English language publications. The effective search date 
was October 15, 2012. 
2
 This is a relatively rough indicator for idea-giving actors that could be further differentiated in future studies. 
Our category of “experts” does not distinguish academic experts and public intellectuals, and it comprises 
pundits who, in a more fine-grained analysis, could be grouped with the actors from the political center due to 
their usually strong connections to established powers. In the “civil society” category we do not distinguish 
between strong and weak organization, i.e. between collective actors with a strong membership or power base 
(such as trade unions, industrial associations etc.) and smaller, informal organizations of engaged citizens.  
3
 Deliberative theorists disagree on whether all public communication should be civil or whether in the 
agenda-building phase uncivil forms of protest and disruption are acceptable or even desirable to put certain 
issues or grievances on the media agenda (Wessler, 2008, p. 5; Rinke et al., 2013, p. 487). 
4 Kriesi (2004) describes Germany as “the typical intermediary case” (p. 205) in this regard. In fact, according 
to Lijphart’s data (2012, p. 305-306), both Germany and the U.S. are only moderate cases of consensus and 
majoritarian systems. If anything, differences between pure majoritarian and consensus systems should be more 
pronounced than between the two cases we study (see results section). 
5
 The following news programs were analyzed in this study. German programs: Tagesschau (ARD), 
Tagesthemen (ARD), RTL aktuell (RTL), Nachrichten (n-tv); U.S. programs: PBS NewsHour (PBS), World News 
(ABC), Anderson Cooper 360° (CNN), Fox Report (Fox News Channel); Russian programs: Novosti (Pervy), 
Novosti 24 (REN-TV), Vesti. Seitschas (Rossija 24). For the German public service station ARD, both main 
evening newscasts (Tagesschau and Tagesthemen) were analyzed because ARD presents two major news 
programs during prime time (TS at 8.00-8.15 pm, and TT at 10.15-10.45 pm). 
6 For details on ownership and market shares for all channels studied, see the online appendix. 
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7 Rossiya 24 is a state-owned news-only channel that effectively serves as an official voice of the Russian 
government; it must therefore be considered partisan in the Russian context. Fox News has been shown to be 
partisan in their news choices, even in the hard-news sections of its program (Groeling, 2008, p. 652). 
Comprehensive content analyses show that CNN does not exhibit a partisan bias towards either side of the 
political spectrum (Holtzman et al., 2011; see also Groseclose & Milyo, 2005). 
8
 In testing the hypotheses formulated in this study, we depart from the often-observed practice of employing 
statistical significance testing to identify differences in media content across countries and media types. This 
study shares with most cross-nationally comparative social research the two fundamental inferential problems of 
a country sample that is non-probabilistic (see Ebbinghaus, 2005; Western & Jackman, 1994) and too small to 
allow inferences on the country level in the logic of classical inference (see Stegmueller, 2013). Standard errors 
and p-values would therefore be uninformative. Instead we report more meaningful and instructive uni- and 
multivariate descriptive analyses such as comparisons of mean ranks and multiple correspondence analysis (on 
the value of descriptive analyses see, e.g., Levine, Weber, Park, & Hullett, 2008). 
9 Ranks reflect the relation between one particular case and the entire set of cases at the expense of 
information about the exact distance between cases. Ranks also provide a unified scale that allows comparisons 
of relative performance across variables with divergent scales. The raw data underlying the ranks are displayed 
in tables 4 to 6. In addition, we complement mean ranks with the more holistic and information-rich approach of 
multiple correspondence analysis (see below). 
10
 MCA is a descriptive multivariate statistical method used to identify and plot systematic associations found 
in a multiway contingency table of categorical variables (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010), and can be thought of as a 
generalization of principal component analysis (PCA) to categorical data analysis. Similar to PCA, it essentially 
identifies the low-dimensional subspace that is maximally close to the set of data points in the true space defined 
by the full set of variables. 
11
 This does not contradict the general pattern that, on average, public-service stations offer more deliberative 
news, because commercial channels are found among the strongest as well as the weak performers. 
